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GRANTiNG PLAINTIFF ALTERNATIvE OF A NEw TRIAL
Plaintiff recovered a $30,000 jury verdict largely for pain and suffering
resulting from whiplash injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Defendant moved for a new trial, alleging that the verdict was excessive.
The lower court sitting en bane agreed and ordered a new trial unless the
plaintiff filed a remittitur consenting to a reduction of the verdict to
$13,000.1 The plaintiff refused and appealed the order granting a new
trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the order for a new trial
and reduced the plaintiff's recovery to $13,000 under the court's statutory
authority to "amend or modify" verdicts. 2 One judge dissented on the
ground that the state constitution's jury trial provision prohibited the
reduction of the verdict without granting the plaintiff the alternative of a
new trial.3 Dornon v. McCarthy, 412 Pa. 595, 195 A.2d 520 (1963).
In 1896, four years after enactment of the statute granting the supreme
court power to "amend or modify" verdicts,4 that court decided Smith v.
Times PublishingCo.,5 in which it interpreted the statute as simply extending to the supreme court the powers which trial judges possess.6 These
1

Whenever damages awarded by a jury are excessive, the trial court has the
power either to grant a new trial absolutely or to give the plaintiff the option of
remitting a portion of the verdict in lieu of a new trial. See, e.g., Kolos v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 405 Pa. 479, 486-87, 176 A.2d 637, 640-41 (1962); Stark v.
Rowley, 323 Pa. 522, 528, 187 At. 509, 511-12 (1936) ; 6A STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA
PRAcricE ch. 28, § 115 (Mottla ed. 1960).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1164 (1953):
The supreme court shall have power in all cases to affirm, reverse, amend
or modify a judgment, order or decree appealed from, and to enter such
judgment, order or decree in the case as the supreme court may deem proper
and just, without returning the record for amendment or modification to the
court below, and may order a verdict and judgment to be set aside and a new
trial had.
The superior court has similar powers. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 192 (1962).
3 Mr. Justice Jones said:
Although I am fully aware that this Court, on several occasions, has, on
appeals from judgments entered in trespass actions, reduced the amount of
such judgments and that such action may be practically sound . . . my

research reveals no authority for such action by this Court and, on the contrary, I am of the opinion that such action is constitutionally inhibited.
Instant case at 600-01, 195 A.2d at 523.
4 See note 2 supra.
-0 178 Pa. 481, 36 AtI. 296 (1897).
1d. at 501-03, 36 Atl. at 300-01 (semble). The concurring opinions of Williams,
I., and Sterrett, C.J., discuss this point thoroughly. Id. at 512-14, 515-16, 36 Atl. at
306-07, 310-11; cf. Osterling v. Allegheny County, 272 Pa. 458, 116 At. 385 (1922),
holding that the amount of the plaintiff's recovery could be set by the supreme court
only because the facts were admitted and the amount of recovery rested on purely
legal issues.
(137)
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powers clearly do not include reduction of verdicts without granting the
plaintiff a new trial alternative 7 except where the plaintiff is, as a matter
of law, not entitled to a particular discrete element of the award 8 or where
the award exceeded the damages sought in plaintiff's pleadings. 9 The
court suggested that a compulsory reduction was forbidden by the constitution's jury trial guarantee.
Until 1932 the court did not deviate from this interpretation.' 0 In
that year, however, it ordered a reduction in Tauber v. Wilkinsburg," a
case involving damages which did not fall within one of the above narrowlydefined categories. The court apparently did not recognize that it was
departing from precedent, as it asserted, citing only dictum in a case
decided two years before, 1 2 that its right to take such action was "well
settled." 13 Since Tauber the court has exercised this power sporadically,
chiefly in cases involving awards for pain and suffering, like the present
case, or of punitive damages.' 4
Despite the statements in Smith, which are supported by virtually every
other American jurisdiction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never

since discussed the constitutionality of its practice.' 5 While this failing in
past cases might be attributed largely to a failure of counsel to raise the
7
The trial court usually does not have the power to reduce a verdict without
granting the plaintiff the option of a new trial. E.g., Gail v. Philadelphia, 273 Pa.
275, 117 At. 69 (1922); Ralston v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. (No. 2), 267
Pa. 278, 110 Ati. 336 (1920) ; Jones v. Stiffier, 137 Pa. Super. 113, 8 A.2d 455 (1939);
6A STANDARD PENNSYLVANiA PRAcricz ch. 28, § 115 (Mottla ed. 1960).
SE.g., Friendly v. Scheetz, 9 S. & R. 156 (Pa. 1823); Jones v. Stifler, supra
note 7; Motors Mortgage Corp. v. Hagerling, 106 Pa. Super. 148, 161 AUt. 447 (1932)
(dictum) ; Parkin v. Safe Deposit Bank, 54 Pa. Super. 54 (1913).
) E.g., Porter v. Zeuger Milk Co., 136 Pa. Super. 48, 7 A.2d 77 (1939) (alternative holding); Bentz v. E. N. Johnson & Co., 21 Pa. Dist. 1068 (C.P. 1910).
10 The supreme court has exercised powers similar to those exercised by the
trial courts. E.g., Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963);
Creighan v. Pittsburgh, 389 Pa. 569, 132 A.2d 867 (1957); Kite v. Jones, 389 Pa.
339, 350, 132 A.2d 683, 689 (1957); Connellsville Borough v. Hogg, 156 Pa. 236,
27 Atl. 25 (1893).
The statute has been used extensively by the supreme court to correct many
other errors made by lower courts. E.g., Adams v. New Kensington, 374 Pa. 104,
97 A.2d 354 (1953) (adjusted shares of jury verdict between plaintiffs) ; Lukens v.
Wharton Ave. Baptist Church, 296 Pa. 1, 145 Atl. 587 (1929) (form of an equity
decree altered); Summers v. Kramer, 271 Pa. 189, 114 AUt. 525 (1921) (forced
president judge to appoint different trial judge); Smith v. Machesney, 238 Pa. 538,
86 At. 493 (1913) (verdict as to one defendant reversed).
11309 Pa. 331, 163 At. 675 (1932).
12 Milyak v. Philadelphia Rural Transit Co., 300 Pa. 457, 464-65, 150 At. 622,
624 (1930), in which the supreme court, apparently relying on the literal words of
the statute, stated that it had the power to "modify the judgment" but gave the
plaintiff the option of accepting either a lower verdict or a new trial.
'3 309 Pa. at 336, 163 AUt. at 676.
14
E.g., Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167, 188, 191 A.2d
662, 673 (1963) (punitive damages) ; Richette v. Pennsylvania RIR., 410 Pa. 6, 187
A.2d 910 (1963) (punitive damages); Jackson v. Yellow Cab Co., 360 Pa. 635, 63
A.2d 54 (1949) (per curiam) (pain and suffering); cf. Walker v. Davis, 189 Pa.
Super. 564, 151 A.2d 812 (1959) (pain and suffering).
15 See note 18 infra and accompanying text. Smith apparently disappeared from
the court's view until the dissent in the instant case. Until then its constitutional
holding was never cited.
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issue, the dissent in the present case posed the problem, but the majority
still declined to cope with it. The court confined its opinion to a discussion
of the precedent for the exercise of the power and the desirable results
achieved by its use.16
Almost every court confronted with the question has held that the
jury trial guarantee of its constitution 17 prohibits courts from reducing a
general verdict without granting the plaintiff the alternative of a new
trial.' 8 The courts rely on two main arguments. First, courts never
exercised a comparable power to overrule verdicts before adoption of the
jury trial provisions, and those provisions prohibit diminishing the role
of the jury. 19 Second, when a court attempts to determine the disputed
The grant of a new trial is an effective instrumentality for seeking and
achieving justice in those instances where the original trial, because of taint,
unfairness or error, produces something other than a just and fair result
[I]f, after a fair trial free of error or prejudice a result appears
which, if permitted to remain, is unjust, justice and reason dictate that if
timely and orderly correction may be made without subjecting the litigants
to the hazards and burdens of retrial, that course should be adopted.
Instant case at 598, 195 A.2d at 522.
17 Most state constitutions provide that the right to trial by jury shall remain
"inviolate," and/or it shall be as "heretofore." LEGISLATIvE DRAFTING RESEARcH
FUND OF COLUmIrA UNIVERSITY, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 578 (2d ed.
1959). PA. CoNrsT. art. 1, § 6, adopted in 1873, provides that "trial by jury shall be
as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolate."
18 See e.g., Johnson v. Louisville & N.R.R., 204 Ala. 662, 87 So. 158 (1920);
Knight v. Seney, 290 Ill. 11, 124 N.E. 813 (1919) (dictum) ; Chester Park Co. v.
Schulte, 120 Ohio St. 273, 166 N.E. 186 (1929) ; Duke v. Fargo, 172 App. Div. 746,
10

158 N.Y. Supp. 1009 (1916) ; Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1163 (1935) ; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 779
(1928). The leading case is Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22 (1889), whose interpretation has been consistently followed. E.g., Washington & G.R.R. v. Harmon's
Adm'r, 147 U.S. 571 (1893); J. T. Majors & Son v. Lippert Bros., 263 F.2d 650
(10th Cir. 1958). Although the federal constitution's jury trial guarantee is more
explicit than Pennsylvania's, these opinions indicate that they should be similarly
interpreted.
Oregon's supreme court has vacillated, but most recently held it could reduce
verdicts without granting the new trial alternative. Shelton v. Lowell, 196 Ore. 430,
Oregon's constitution, however, differs from Penn450, 249 P.2d 958, 967 (1952).
sylvania's by containing a section, in addition to a trial by jury requirement, that
authorizes the state's supreme court to alter jury verdicts on appeal under specified
circumstances. ORE. CONsT. art. VII, § 3. See generally Lusk, Forty-Five Years
of Article VII, Section 3, Constitution of Oregon, 35 ORE. L. REv. 1, 16-20, 22-29
(1955) ; Tongue, In Defense of Juries as Exclusive Judges of the Facts, 35 ORE. L.
REV. 143 (1956).
At one time Wisconsin, whose constitution is similar to that of Pennsylvania,
permitted the trial court to reduce verdicts without granting the new trial alternative.
This practice is no longer considered constitutional. See Campbell v. Sutliff, 193
Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927) (dictum). Wisconsin also developed the unusual
practice of giving the defendant the option of accepting the highest reasonable amount
that the jury could have awarded. If the defendant failed to accept, the plaintiff then
could accept an award of the lowest reasonable amount or a new trial. See, e.g.,
Blaisdell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1 Wis. 2d 19, 82 N.W.2d 896 (1957); Campbell v.
Sutliff, supra. This practice has been abandoned. Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10
Wis. 2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960). See generally James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts: New Trial on Some or All Issues, Remittitur and
Additur, 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 143 (1963) ; Hanley, Dealing With Excessive Verdicts,
34 Wis. B. Bull., Oct. 1961, p. 25.
19
For a thorough discussion of this argument, see Campbell v. Sutliff, supra
note 18.
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amount to which the plaintiff is entitled, it is determining a fact-the
monetary damages necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries20
which is a function the constitutional provisions reserve to the jury.
Pennsylvania courts never exercised the power to reduce verdicts before the constitutional provision was adopted. But this fact is not conclusive, since many limitations on jury trial have been upheld. Access
to juries has been limited by requirements of an affirmative request for
a jury trial within a specified time 21 or of a hearing before a master, with
22
llore importantly,
appeal to a jury permitted only on certain conditions.
the replacement of the demurrer to the evidence, which if overruled resulted
in loss of the entire case, by the directed verdict and judgment n.o.v. has
made it much safer and therefore more common for a party to obtain decision by a judge rather than by the jury.P In addition the circumstances
under which a directed verdict may be granted have been expanded
greatly.24
Nor is it conclusive that a court is determining a question of fact.
Although the trial court granting a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v.
rules "as a matter of law" that no reasonable jury could find for the
opposing party, it often is actually determining disputed facts.2
In light of the clear constitutionality of these practices, the right to
trial by jury is seen as simply the right to have all facts on which reasonable
men may differ determined by the community, represented by twelve of its
members, and not by judges. Thus, where a court can say that reasonable
men could not reasonably differ, it may dispose of the case. This justification for directed verdicts and judgments n.o.v. arguably applies to reduction of verdicts to the highest reasonable amount, without granting the
alternative of a new trial. If a court may set aside a verdict because it is
unreasonable, it should be able to set aside just part of a verdict on the
same ground, allowing that part of it which is reasonable to stand. Moreover, courts clearly have the power to grant a new trial, or even a new
trial conditioned upon the plaintiff's refusing a voluntary remittitur, when
the jury verdict is unreasonably high. In exercising this power the judges
must, at least in their own minds, determine roughly the highest amount
that a jury considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
could reasonably award. It can be argued that, since the court can make
this determination and act on it to the extent of granting a new trial, the
20 See Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 26-30 (1889) ; Smith v. Times Publishing
Co., 178 Pa. 481, 512-14, 36 Atl. 296, 310-11 (1896) (Williams, J., concurring).
21
E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b), Wilson v. Corning Glass Works, 195 F.2d 825

(9th Cir. 1952).
22
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §21 (1963), Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112
A.2d 625 (1955).
23 A perceptive discussion of this development is contained in Galloway v. United
States, 319 U.S. 372, 399-407 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
24 See id. at 388-96; id. at 401-07 (Black, J., dissenting).
25 6 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE ch. 25, §§ 14-26 (Mottla ed. 1960).

Pennsylvania appellate courts have similar powers. See note 2 supra.
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court should be able to save the parties time and trouble by simply allowing
26
Furthermore, if a
the plaintiff to recover this highest reasonable amount.
could reasonably
jury
the
new
that
seem
it
would
new trial were granted,
if the plainonly
court
by
the
set
amount
the
than
render a verdict higher
by jury
trial
of
guarantee
constitutional
The
tiff established new facts.
establish
to
court
in
day
second
to
a
right
certainly does not include the
these additional facts.
Where the highest reasonable amount is an ascertainable figure, this
analysis seems sound. Thus, it would apply in many cases involving a
determination of contract damages or lost earnings, where the degree of
imprecision in calculation of the highest reasonable amount probably would
not exceed that inherent in deciding whether to give a directed verdict.
Where, however, it is impossible to determine with reasonable precision the highest reasonable damages-for example, in cases involving
pain and suffering-the analysis is less satisfactory. It would seem virtually impossible for a court to find a figure for pain and suffering damages
of which it could say that reasonable men could go that high but no
higher. Indeed, it seems doubtful that the court would have upset
a jury verdict which was slightly higher than the figure actually chosen
by the court itself. Admittedly, courts attempt such a calculation in order
to protect defendants from unreasonable juries. Traditionally, however,
the basic right to have the community make the determination has been
preserved by allowing the plaintiff a retrial. The court which presumes
to take away this last right and bind the plaintiff to its determination
27
Furthermore,
deprives him of his constitutionally-guaranteed jury trial.
damsuffering
and
as
pain
losses
nonpecuniary
such
of
the determination
of
determination
the
in
present
not
element
ages involves a subjective
elesubjective
the
that
requires
guarantee
ordinary facts. The jury trial
ment involved be that of the community and not of judges.
Furthermore, the supreme court has not made clear its criteria for
determining the proper cases for the exercise of this power. Its statements
on the subject indicate that the court will reduce verdicts without granting
the new trial alternative whenever the trial itself is free of error or prejudice
28
This seems to encompass all cases in
other than the excessive verdict.
26 Such a procedure would not deprive the defendant of his right to a jury trial
reason
since he is not automatically entitled to a new trial whenever the jury exceeds for
the
recovery
in the amount of its verdict. A new trial hurts the plaintiff. His
of a
injuries caused by the defendant is delayed, and he is subjected to the danger
verdict which, although not unreasonably low, may be below the highest reasonable
jury
amount. A new trial is constitutionally due the defendant only when the wholewhich
by a jury
verdict was infected with passion and prejudice, as he has had a trial Since
the court's
awarded the plaintiff even more than the highest reasonable amount.
he cannot comencroachment upon that verdict inures to the benefit of the defendant,
plain of deprivation of his right to jury trial. See generally Carlin, Remittiturs and

Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1942) ; 44 YAL. L.J. 318 (1934).

27 See generally Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 406 (1943) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
28 See, e.g., instant case at 598, 195 A.2d at 522 ("if timely and orderly correction
may be made without subjecting the litigants to the hazards and burdens of retrial") ;
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which a voluntary remittitur is traditionally used; but the court has never
indicated abandonment of the voluntary remittitur, and it has continued
to affirm voluntary remittitur orders in similar cases, at least until
recently.If the court has in fact abandoned use of the voluntary
remittitur, it has given a new advantage to defendants without apparently
realizing it. Denying the plaintiff in an excessive verdict case a choice
between new trial and remittitur increases the likelihood that the defendant
will benefit if he appeals a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial or its
determination of a remittitur figure, because, whether he wins or loses,
he will not be forced to undergo a new trial. On the other hand, the plaintiff who is dissatisfied with a remittitur figure may, if he appeals, lose his
option to elect a new trial, without gaining a satisfactory award.30 Since
the trial court does not have the authority to order compulsory remittiturs,
this situation also presents the anomaly that the defendant whose motion for
a new trial on the ground that the verdict is excessive is totally refused
by the trial court may be better off than one whose motion is conditionally granted.3 1
Finally, the supreme court seems to have been inconsistent in setting
the amounts to which it has reduced verdicts. In just two cases has it
indicated a reduction to the highest reasonable amount.3 2 In the present
case the court said its practice was to reduce verdicts to "the amounts
which should properly have been awarded in the courts below." 3 Other
articulations of a standard include "justice to all parties," 34 fair compensaMeholiff v. River Transit Co., 342 Pa. 394, 400, 20 A.2d 762, 765 (1941) (fairness
of the trial and lack of reversible error) ; O'Hara v. Scranton, 342 Pa. 137, 140, 19
A.2d 114, 116 (1941) ("expense of further litigation"); Brown v. Paxton, 332 Pa.
260, 2265, 2 A.2d 729, 731 (1938) (hardship to the plaintiff in relitigating the issue).
(per curiam);
9E.g., LaPosta v. Himmer, 358 Pa. 69, 55 A.2d 751 (1947)
DeMarino v. Baltimore & O.R.Rt, 349 Pa. 314, 36 A.2d 784 (1944) (per curiam);
Culver v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 322 Pa. 503, 186 Atl. 70 (1936).
30 The appealing plaintiff in the instant case, for example, was forced to accept
the award which he had already declined by refusing the trial court's voluntary
remittitur.
31 The court's practice would seem more reasonable, although still unconstitutional,
if the court generally accepted, as it did in the present case, the determination as to
excessiveness made by the trial court, which has the advantage of first-hand observation of the plaintiff and witnesses. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, sometimes reduces the award by more than the amount of the remittitur set by the trial
judge, e.g., McCarthy v. Ference, 358 Pa. 485, 501, 58 A.2d 49, 57 (1948) ; Libengood v. Pennsylvania R.R., 358 Pa. 7, 55 A.2d 756 (1947), or even reduces a verdict
which the trial judge has not found excessive, e.g., Meholiff v. River Transit Co.,
342 Pa. 394, 20 A.2d 762 (1941).
32Id. at 400, 20 A.2d at 765 ("the largest amount that the evidence will support");
Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 496, 181 Atl. 792, 796 (1936) ("largest amount which
can be supported as not excessive").
33 Instant case at 599, 195 A.2d at 522. The court relied on Kite v. Jones, 389
Pa. 339, 132 A.2d 683 (1957) ; Jackson v. Yellow Cab Co., 360 Pa. 635, 63 A.2d 54
(1949) (per curiam); and Brown v. Paxton, 332 Pa. 260, 2 A.2d 729 (1938). The
reliance on Kite, in which the supreme court simply ruled as a matter of law that the
plaintiff was not entitled to any award for lost earnings because his employer had
continued to pay him, indicates the court's continuing failure to distinguish between
reducing a general award and subtracting a particular, discrete quantity to which the
plaintiff is not legally entitled. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
34 Purcell v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 411 Pa. 167, 188, 191 A2d 662,
673 (1963).
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tion to the plaintiff,35 "a fair and perhaps generous amount,"

36

"not exces-

3s

sive," Wand adequate compensation
The most reasonable interpretation
of most of these purported tests, including that in the present case, indicates
an amount less than the highest reasonable award. Even if reduction to
the highest reasonable amount could be supported, such reduction to a
lower figure is dearly unconstitutional. The fact that one jury has acted
unreasonably does not give the court the power to dispense entirely with
a jury determination and set the damages itself.

FEDERAL

C OURTS-UNITED STATES AND FEDERAL HoUIsnG
COMMISSIONER PROPER PARTIES TO ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF FUNDS
DIVERTED FRoM CORPoRATIONS

The United States, the Federal Housing Commissioner, and three
Texas corporations brought suit for the return by individual and corporate
defendants of funds alleged to have been improperly diverted from the
plaintiff corporations. These corporations had been formed by the individual defendants to construct and operate rental housing projects
financed through mortgages insured by the Commissioner under the National Housing Act.1 As a condition to the insurance of their mortgages,
they were required to adopt corporate charters containing provisions
stipulated by the Commissioner. The plaintiffs contend that the funds
were diverted in violation of these provisions, and that the defendants
either caused or knowingly received the benefits of these diversions. The
district court found that the only causes of action stated by the complaint
were ones for debts owed the corporations under state law; that the United
States and the Commissioner were not proper parties to those actions; and
that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed as to the remaining parties.
It therefore dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the corporate
plaintiffs.2 The court of appeals reversed, holding that:
In view of [cited cases] . . . the express language of [12
U.S.C.] § 1702, the provisions of the [National Housing] Act
and the purpose and intent of the Act and the Commissioner's role
thereunder, the conclusion is inescapable that under the circumstances alleged . . . the United States and the Commissioner
35
Smith v. Allegheny County, 377 Pa. 365, 369, 105 A.2d 137, 139 (1954).
3

6Duffy v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 371 Pa. 361, 364, 89 A.2d 804, 805
(1952).
37
Libengood v. Pennsylvania R.Th, 358 Pa. 7, 13, 55 A.2d 756, 759 (1947).
38 O'Hara v. Scranton, 342 Pa. 137, 140, 19 A.2d 114 (1941).
148 Stat 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-50 (1958).
Record, pp. 207-13. The court held that the Commissioner and the United
States had no federal claim and that they could not bring a derivative action under
state law because the corporations were willing and able to sue. Id. at 211-12. It
further found that there was no diversity of citizenship between the remaining parties,
and that no federal question was presented. Id. at 213.
2

144

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.113

are proper parties and that the federal courts have jurisdiction to
try the issues. 3
United States v. LeMay, 322 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1963).
The court of appeals' opinion does not clearly establish the source of
the Government's claim in the present action. In citing section 1 of the
National Housing Act,4 authorizing the Commissioner to sue in any state
or federal court, the court seems to imply that the claim arises under this
provision. But the court does not cite any substantive provision granting
the Government a right to sue; it speaks only of the purpose and intent
of the act generally and "the Commissioner's role thereunder." In section 207 o of the act, Congress directed the Agency, and in
section 608 7 authorized it, to require mortgagors to be restricted or regulated in their affairs in order to qualify their mortgages for insurance.
However, the only indication of the intended means by which the restriction
should be accomplished is a statutory authorization of the Commissioner
to make such contracts with and acquire such stock or interest in the
3 Instant case at 104.
4 "The Commissioner shall, in carrying out the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapters II, III, VI-VIII, and X of this chapter, be authorized, in his official
capacity, to sue and be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal."
48 Stat. 1246 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1702 (1958).
5 See note 3 supra and accompanying text. While substantive provisions are cited
elsewhere in the opinion, instant case at 103, they are done so only as a group, as
examples demonstrating that the interest of the Government is not that of a "mere
guarantor."
(b) . . . the Commissioner is authorized to insure mortgages . . .
6
which cover property held by-

(2) Private corporations . . . which, until the termination of all obligations of the Commissioner under such insurance, are regulated or restricted
by the Commissioner as to rents or sales, charges, capital structure, rate of
return, and methods of operation to such extent and in such manner as to
provide reasonable rentals to tenants and a reasonable return on the investment. The Commissioner may make such contracts with, and acquire for not
to exceed $100 such stock or interest in, any such corporation . . . as he may
deem necessary to render effective such restriction or regulation. Such stock
or interest shall be paid for out of such Housing Fund, and shall be redeemed
by the corporation . . . at par upon the termination of all obligations of
the Commissioner under the insurance.
52 Stat 17 (1938), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1713(b) (2) (1958), as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 1713(b) (2) (Supp. V, 1964). The mortgages of two of the three plaintiff
corporations were insured under this section.
(b) To be eligible for insurance under this section a mortgage shall meet
7
the following conditions:
(1) The mortgaged property shall be held by a mortgagor approved by
the Commissioner. The Commissioner may, in his discretion, require such
mortgagor to be regulated or restricted as to rents or sales, charges, capital
structure, rate of return, and methods of operation. The Commissioner may
make such contracts with, and acquire for not to exceed $100 stock or interest
in any such mortgagor, as the Commissioner may deem necessary to render
effective such restriction or regulation. Such stock or interest shall be paid
for out of the War Housing Insurance Fund, and shall be redeemed by the
mortgagor at par upon the termination of all obligations of the Commissioner
under the insurance.
56 Stat. 303 (1942), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1743(b) (1) (1958). The third plaintiff
corporation qualified its mortgage under this section.
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mortgagor as he deems necessary to render the restriction effective. 8
Pursuant to this authorization, the Commissioner promulgated regulations
governing the eligibility of mortgages in excess of $200,000 which require
that the mortgaged property must be held by a corporation whose charter
contained stipulated restrictions upon corporate action. 9 The corporation
was also required to agree to issue to the Commissioner for $100 all shares
of a special class of preferred stock giving the Commissioner special supervisory rights under the charter, including the right to assume full voting
control and to replace the board of directors upon the denial of these special
rights or the violation of any required charter provision. 10 But nowhere
in the act is the mortgagor's failure to comply with charter restrictions
stated to give rise to either a civil or criminal cause of action.',
The federal courts have held that suits to enjoin the Commissioner
from exercising his right to replace corporate directors because of alleged
charter violations are removable from the state courts,' 2 basing their decisions alternatively on sections 14 4 1(a) and (b) 13 and section 1442
(a) (1) 14 of the Judicial Code. Moreover, the Commissioner has been
allowed to enjoin interference with his exercise of this same right in a
8 See notes 6-7 supra.
These regulations merely
9 12 Fed. Reg. 8813 (1947) ; 13 Fed. Reg. 2194 (1948).
detail the provisions required of corporate mortgagors' charters for establishing
eligibility of the mortgage for insurance. They are fully satisfied when the provisions
are included in the charters. Moreover, as is pointed out in the Reply Brief for
Appellants, p. 5, the charter provision in issue in the instant case was not among those
required by the regulations.
10 The regulations required that the special stock qualify as a valid class of stock
under state law. 13 Fed. Reg. 2194 (1948).
11 Compare these provisions with that of the third paragraph of 64 Stat. 53 (1950),
as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1713(b) (2) (Supp. V, 1964), which reads: "[N]o mortgage
shall be insured hereunder unless the mortgagor certifies under oath that in selecting
tenants for the property covered by the mortgage he will not discriminate against
any family by reason of the fact that there are children in the family . . . . Violation
of any such certification shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not to exceed

$500."2
1 Sarner v. Mason, 128 F. Supp. 165 (D.N..), aff'd, 228 F.2d 176 (3d Cir.
1955); James River Apartments, Inc. v. FHA, 136 F. Supp. 24 (D. Md. 1955). See
also Clifton Park Manor, Section One, Inc. v. Mason, 137 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1955)
(plaintiffs estopped from denying federal jurisdiction by pleadings in prior action).
13 (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or
residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(b) (1958).
14 (a) A civil action . . . commenced in a State court against any of the
following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or any
person acting under him, for any act under color of such office . . ..
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) (1958).
In Sarner v. Mason, 128 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 228 F.2d 176 (3d Cir.
1955), the court of appeals affirmed only on the basis of this section.
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district court 15 under the original jurisdiction provisions of sections 1331 10
and 1345 17 of the Code. The choice of law governing the Commissioner's
rights was not squarely presented in the removal cases. 1 8 However, in
the Commissioner's action for an injunction, the court was acting upon a
motion to dismiss because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the failure of the complaint to state a claim on which relief could be
granted.' 9 While jurisdiction could have been retained under section 1345
of the Code if the court had found that the complaint stated a claim under
state law, the court did not discuss this question, holding instead that the
Commissioner, as a "special kind of stockholder," could enforce his rights
under the National Housing Act.20
2
The choice of law question was again presented in Mason v. Hirsh, 1
where the Commissioner sought recovery for the corporation of dividends
paid from excess proceeds of the insured loan at a time when the corporation was without surplus or earnings.22 On the defendants' motion to strike
the Commissioner as plaintiff and to dismiss the action because of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter,3 the court concluded that the Com15 Mason v. Kavy, 134 F. Supp. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1955). The Commissioner sought
to enjoin the former directors and officers of the corporation from preventing new
directors and officers, elected pursuant to his rights under the corporate charter,
from entering the premises of the corporation and having access to the books and
records and from otherwise performing their duties.
16 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958).
17 "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the
United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act
of Congress." 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1958).
18 See note 13 supra.
As the FHA and the Commissioner have been held to be citizens of the District
of Columbia for purposes of service of process and diversity of citizenship, Garden
Homes, Inc. v. Mason, 249 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 903 (1958),
a finding that removal was proper under §§ 1441 (a) and (b) did not require a finding
that these cases arose under federal law. However, even if such a finding were made,
which seems to have been true in these cases, this does not constitute a finding that
the federal claim is meritorious, but only that the complaint bases its claim on federal
law and is not frivolous. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Moreover, should
the claim for relief not be upheld on federal grounds, the federal court may retain
jurisdiction to decide any state questions it raises. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238,
243 (1932). Thus, the courts could have issued the injunctions requested had they
found that the Commissioner was entitled to them under either federal or state law.
19 Mason v. Kavy, 134 F. Supp. 451, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
20 Id. at 454.
21140 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
22 The complaint alleged that the dividends had been paid from an excess of the
mortgage proceeds over the cost of construction, after a fraudulent appraisal of the
newly-constructed housing. The dividends left the corporations insolvent and resulted
in default on the mortgage debt. Id. at 454-55. However, it does not appear that
the Commissioner had paid any claim of the mortgagee or taken an assignment of
any claim from him. In the instant case it is not even alleged that the diverted funds
were proceeds of the insured loan or that the mortgage is in default.
The defendants also moved for dismissal on the ground that if
23 Id. at 456.
the Commissioner was a proper party, he was so only as a stockholder pressing a
derivative suit and not in his capacity as Commissioner. Ibid. This differentiation
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missioner had a duty, arising from the act and his position thereunder, "of
prohibiting any illegal dividends or illegal payments" 2 by corporate mortgagors. Thus, it followed that the Commissioner "has the right to sue and
compel a restoration of moneys so illegally taken." 2 As in the present
case, no specific provision was cited, and the Commissioner's right was apparently derived from the existence of a governmental interest arising from
the operation of the insurance program, independent of any statutory
provision.
The source of law on a particular issue is, of course, settled if a federal
statute either provides the governing rule 2 6 or expressly incorporates state
law on the subject.2 7 But where the statute provides no explicit direction,
the Rules of Decision Act 28 prescribes state law unless implementation
of the statute "requires" a different rule. When otherwise applicable state
law would subvert interests Congress sought to protect by statute, the
federal courts may fashion their own rule to protect and promote the
national objectives.29 However, when state rules adequately promote
congressional objectives, they should be adopted. 0
Sections 207 31 and 608 2 of the National Housing Act were cited by
the court only as evidencing a governmental interest in the operation of
mortgagors. But this is not the same as evidencing a congressional intention that the Commissioner should have a special federal right to protect
its interest. If Congress had assumed that the Government's interests
would be protected by means of federal law fashioned by the courts, the
is without merit, for even if the Commissioner's only rights are those of a stockholder
under state law, he acquired them in his official capacity and solely pursuant to the
federal program he administers. Thus, his exercise of those rights would be in his
official capacity for jurisdictional purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1958).
24

140 F. Supp. at 458. The court does not say to what law it looks in determining

that the dividends were illegal.
25 Ibid.
26

See §20 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.

§ 77t (1958), which empowers the SEC to seek and the federal district courts to grant
injunctions and restraining orders against violations of the Commission's rules and
regulations, and writs of mandamus compelling compliance.
27 See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
28 "The

laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of

the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where

they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1958).

29 See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (licensee held
not estopped to challenge validity of patent when provisions of license violate
Sherman Act); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (FDIC

allowed recovery on accommodation note despite state defense of lack of consideration

because of policy established by Federal Reserve Act of 1934) ; Dietrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190 (1940) (receiver of national bank allowed recovery on note despite
state-recognized defense because executed to circumvent provision of National Bank

Act).

30 See Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939) (state rule on
recoverability of interest on illegally collected taxes adopted); United States v.
Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956) (statute making criminal conversion of property
mortgaged to Farmer Home Administration found not to evince federal policy to
replace state law governing title to property).
31 See note 6 supra.
32See note 7 supra.
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provision in these sections for stock acquisition would have been unnecessary. The fact that Congress authorized the Commissioner to acquire
stock, carrying certain rights under state law and no special rights under
federal statute, would seem to show an intention that his rights with
respect to the operation of corporate mortgagors be governed by state law.
Moreover, the fact that Congress chose a program of government insurance
for private mortgages, rather than government loans or government housing, demonstrates an intention to limit governmental interference with
established business norms. Congress could easily have provided for the
promulgation by the Commissioner of regulations directly binding upon the
corporation and all persons dealing with it, and provided for their enforce33
ment in the federal courts.
In the present case the court speaks of Congress not intending to leave
the Commissioner powerless to carry out his functions,3 4 but does not examine the remedies available to him under state law. Diversion of corporate funds is declared unlawful by state statute,as and the state courts
have recognized a cause of action in the corporation to recover diverted
funds.0 6 Even should the corporation be barred by the state statute of
limitations, as it may have been in the present case,37 it does not follow
that the Commissioner must be given a federal cause of action. First,
the statute of limitations may not be applicable to the corporate claim
since the Government is in full control.3 8 Even if it should be appliSee note 26 supra.
The fact that the Commissioner's regulations do not purport to exercise direct
regulatory power, but provide only for restriction of corporate mortgagors through
their corporate charters and his ownership of stock, is evidence of an official interpretation of the provisions as incorporating state law.
34 Instant case at 103.
3
5 Tzx. Rxv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (1962).
36 See Dunagaun v. Bushey, 152 Tex. 630, 263 S.W.2d 148 (1953)
(dictum),
which allowed the stockholders of a disenfranchised corporation to recover diverted
funds, while recognizing that the claim would have belonged to the corporation had
its charter not previously been forfeited to the state.
Even in the absence of statute, a stockholder may sue to enjoin an unauthorized
diversion of funds, and the consummated diversion would give rise to a corporate
claim. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 144 (rev. ed. 1946) ; 13 FL.rcHza, CycLoPEDIA ON CORPORATIONS § 5915.1 (rev. ed. 1961). The majority of states would also
have allowed recovery by the Commissioner of illegal dividends in the situation of
Mason v. Hirsh, 140 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1956), had he obtained an assignment
of the mortgage debt. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text; BALLANTINE, Op.
cit. supra § 255; LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 492-93 (1959).
37 The district court assumed in its opinion on the motion to dismiss, Record,
pp. 208, 211, that the Commissioner and the United States were parties to the present
action in order to invoke sovereign immunity from the state statute of limitations
which had run against the corporate claims. See United States v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301, 308 (1960); United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S.
414, 416 (1940).
38 The corporations might be found to be government instrumentalities since the
Commissioner is in full control, and entitled to immunity from the state statute. However, this might be contrary to the policy of 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1958), which denies
federal jurisdiction of any case by or against a corporation incorporated under a federal
statute unless the United States owns more than half the capital stock. This provision evidences an intention that such corporations not receive special treatment
merely because they were formed in connection with a government program. On
33
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cable, 39 the courts may modify the operation of this particular state rule
if it is found to subvert unduly the objectives of the federal program.
Rejection of the state rule should turn upon a finding that it is generally
inadequate for the effectuation of a federal objective, not merely upon the
fact that a federal interest would be better served in the particular case by
a different rule. If the state statute of limitations provides inadequate
time for the discovery and prosecution of claims by the Commissioner, it
should be modified in its application to cases such as the present one.
But state law should not be rejected, either in total or in part, because of
inefficiency in pursuing a valid state claim.
The Supreme Court has on occasion rejected state law, even in the
absence of a federal statute, where it has been necessary to protect the
effective performance of a governmental function. In Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States,40 the question was the liability to the United States of
an endorsing bank on a Treasury check bearing a forged prior endorsement.
An applicable state rule would have absolved the bank because of the
Treasury's delay in notifying it of the forgery. The Court held that, despite
the silence of Congress, as the authority to issue the check stemmed from
the Constitution and statutes of the United States, the rights and duties
of the Government arising from its issuance were matters of federal not
state law. It then rejected state law as the source of the governing rule,
finding that efficient functioning of the Treasury necessitated that its rights
and duties on commercial paper it issued not be subjected to the nonuniform
laws of the several states.41 The broad grounds 42 upon which the Clearthe other hand, the exception for corporations in which the United States owns more
than half the capital stock could have been intended to provide federal jurisdiction
when the Government is in control. However, this analysis is negatived by the
reference to capital stock rather than voting stock.
39
Even if the corporate claims were brought in the name of the United States, the
statute of limitations might not be avoided if the Government were found to have no
legally protected interest and merely to be suing derivatively in behalf of the corporations. Cf. United States v. New Orleans Pac. Ry. Co., 248 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1919)
(doctrine of laches applies when United States sues for the benefit of a private party).
40 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
41 Id. at 367. But see Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944);
RFC v. United Distillers Prods. Corp., 229 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1956). See also United
States v. McCabe Co., 261 F.2d 539, 543 (8th Cir. 1958) ; New York, N.H. & H.R.R.
v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Arnold & S. Bleichroeder,
Inc., 96 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
The correctness of the Clearfield decision has been questioned on the grounds
that necessity of uniform law was not sufficiently clear and that uniformity is not
necessarily assured by allowing the federal courts to fashion their own law. See
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law"; Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rv. 797, 813, 828-32
(1957) ; Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUm. L. Rxv.
991 (1953). For the view that state law should be rejected only when a major federal
policy is at stake, see Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1442-46 (1960).
42 The decision was interpreted by some to require that uniform federal law be
fashioned to govern all cases involving government-issued commercial paper, see
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 35 (1956) (Black
and Douglas, JJ., dissenting), and by one judge to govern all cases involving federal
currency, Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. Hamilton Natl Bank, 199 F.2d 127, 133
(6th Cir. 1952) (Miller, J., dissenting).
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field decision was reached were later narrowed in Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell,43 which concerned title to federal bonds
stolen from one bank and negotiated to another. The Court held that,
while uncertainty as to the rights and obligations represented by the bonds
themselves would substantially affect the efficiency of Treasury operations,
uncertainty as to the rights of private parties would not so affect the
Treasury as to require a uniform federal rule.
On the basis of Clearfield, Parnell,and other decisions of the Court,'"
it could be concluded that the rights and duties of the Government arising
from the performance of a governmental function are always to be governed
by a uniform federal rule. However, this interpretation is subject to
serious question. The Constitution,45 in enumerating the cases over
which the federal courts would have original jurisdiction, established separate categories for cases to which the United States was a party and those
arising under federal law. The first category would be unnecessary if it
were intended that the rights of the government were always to be matters
of federal law. Moreover, the Rules of Decision Act does not except cases
involving the Government from its choice of law rule. There is also the
practical consideration that a uniform federal rule governing the rights
of the United States would often result in merely shifting burdens from
the Government to private parties whose rights against others are governed
by state law.4 8 A sounder analysis would appear to be that state law is to
be rejected only when it seriously impedes the performance of a federal
function or the effectuation of federal policies, regardless of the parties to
the action. 47
(1956).
44 See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1947) ; United
States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944).
45 U.S. CowsT. art III,§ 2.
43 352 U.S. 29

46 See Mishkin, supra note 41, at 831; Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 1428, 1445-46

(1960).
47 See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law"; Competence and
Discretionin the Choice of National and State Rides for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
797 (1957); Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 CoLum.
L. Rv. 991 (1953) ; Comment, 69 YALX L.J. 1428 (1960).

The possibility that a particular case will require modification of a state rule does
not require that the federal courts have original jurisdiction over it. If the state
courts should prove unsympathetic in their treatment of a federal program or policy,
review by the Supreme Court is available. Such review is probably especially available
to a federal agency claiming state impediments to the performance of its functions.
However, one commentator has suggested that "federal question" jurisdiction be
extended to provide a sympathetic federal forum for cases arising within the context
of a federal legislative program, regardless of the law governing the case. See
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLuIm. L. REV. 157
(1953). This theory has been recognized in a concurring opinion by two Supreme
Court justices. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 459 (1957)
(Burton and Harlan, JJ., concurring). But see id. at 475-77 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Such "protective jurisdiction" has yet to be accepted by a majority of the
Court Furthermore, this theory merely determines the existence of federal jurisdiction and would not determine the choice of law in the particular case.
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LABOR LAW-CoRT

RVERSEs BOARD'S HOLDING THAT CoiBARGAINNG AGREEMENT SANCTIONING REFUSAL To CRoss
LEcTvFr
CERTAIN PmmARY PICKET Lnns Is HOT CARGO AGREEMENT

A clause of the collective bargaining agreement between Teamsters
Local 413 and an employer association provided:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be
cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an employee
. refuses to go through or work behind any picket line,
including the picket line of Unions party to this Agreement and
including picket lines at the Employer's place or places of business.
The National Labor Relations Board held I that this clause was a "hot
cargo" agreement, illegal under section 8(e) of the National Labor
Relations Act.2 It recognized that the parties could agree not to cross
picket lines in certain situations,3 but considered the agreement in question
to be illegal because it sanctioned refusals to cross picket lines which did
not meet the two requirements of the proviso to section 8(b) (4) of the
act.4 This proviso provides that refusals to cross picket lines at places
of business other than the place of employment are lawful if the picketing
is accompanied by a strike, and the strike is ratified or approved by a
I Truck Drivers Union (Patton Warehouse), 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963). After
this decision, but before the court's decision, the Board repeatedly reached the same
result. Teamsters Union (California Ass'n of Employers), 145 N.L.R.B. No. 145
(Feb. 4, 1964); Hod Carriers Union (Fiesta Pools), 145 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (Jan. 10,
1964); Local 559, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Anopolsky), 145 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (Dec.
30, 1964); General Local 200, Chauffeurs Union (Milwaukee Cheese Co.), 144 N.L.
R.B. No. 81 (Sept. 26, 1963); Truck Drivers Union (Brown Transp. Corp.), 140
N.L.R.B. 1436 (1963).
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
2
employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling,
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any
other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an
agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void ....
National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), added by 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§158(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
3 The Board held that an employee's refusal to cross a picket line at his own
employer's place of business was protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958) (guaranteeing the right
of employees to engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or protection), and § 13
of the same act, 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958) (strikes
shall not be interfered with except as specifically provided). The Board also held
that the § 8(b) (4) proviso of the National Labor Relations Act, added by 61 Stat.
142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1958), was implied in § 8(e) and to this extent
the collective-bargaining agreement was lawful.
4 "[P]rovided, that nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed
to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer
(other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in
a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act .

U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963).

.

.

. '

73 Stat 542 (1959),
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majority union.5 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed that part of the Board's decision which held illegal an agreement
sanctioning refusals to cross primary picket lines which do not satisfy
the proviso requirements. 6 Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539
(D.C. Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3085 (U.S.
Sept. 3, 1964) (No. 453).
The basic difference between the decisions of the Board and court of
appeals is the court's holding that the legality under section 8(e) of a
contract provision is dependent on whether the activity to which the agreement relates is primary or secondary. 7 While it has never explicitly
rejected this position, the Board has not adopted it and has found violations
of section 8(e) in other cases where the activity was primary.8

The

legislative history of the original Taft-Hartley section 8(b) (4) secondary
5 The § 8(b) (4) proviso refers to a union the employer is required to recognize
under the act. In most cases this means a union representing a majority of the
employees in the bargaining unit, but some majority unions may not be covered by
the proviso. For example, the existence of a collective bargaining agreement with
another union may delay the obligation of the employer to recognize the majority
union until the agreement expires. Thus, although the term "majority union" will
be used generally herein to refer to a union covered by the proviso, it is not absolutely precise, and the exceptions to the duty of an employer to recognize a majority
union must be kept in mind.
The only legislative history of the proviso indicates that it was designed to make
clear that only "wildcat" strikes by minority unions are illegal. S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947), in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT OF 1947, at 429 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LMRA
HISTORY]. Nothing is mentioned about no-strike activity. Thus, it seems that Congress had a very narrow goal for the proviso.
It has been argued that the proviso was originally part of another bill, was left
in the final bill through inertia, and is inconsistent with the final statutory scheme
-bs enacted. Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUm. L. REv.
1363, 1406 (1962).
In an amicus brief in the instant case, the Glass Bottle Blowers Association
argued that the § 8(b) (4) proviso was designed to immunize from § 8(b) (4) the
refusals of neutrals to cross certain secondary picket lines at the place of business
of another employer, and that it was completely inapplicable to primary picket lines.
The union argued that it is too difficult for a neutral union to have to determine if a
picket line at another place of business is primary or secondary. The employer whose
place of business is being picketed always has recourse against the picketing union.
Moreover, few secondary strikes would be ratified or approved by a majority union.
Therefore, the neutral union need only inquire if there is a strike approved or ratified
by a majority union. Brief for the Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 18-19. The union's interpretation of the proviso would seem to be quite logical;
however, it is not supported by any legislative history found in the debates concerning
the Taft-Hartley Act. The union does cite legislative history found in the debates
concerning the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 105 CONG. REC.
15677-78 (1959), in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSuRE Acr OF 1959, at 1619-20 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
LMRDA HISTORY], that gives Congressman Cramer's interpretation of the proviso
passed in 1947. The authoritativeness of these -remarks is doubtful.
Professor Lesnick's analysis of the way in which the proviso language became
part of the final bill seems well documented. Moreover, the proviso was ignored
from its enactment in 1947 until the Board referred to it in the instant case.
6 The court did find a § 8(e) violation because the clause was broad enough to
sanction refusals to cross secondary picket lines.
7 See instant case at 542-45.
8 See Local 710, Meat & Highway Drivers (Wilson & Co.), 143 N.L.R.B. 1221
(1963).
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boycott provisions 9 indicates that they were not designed to prevent
primary activity,10 and the legislative history of section 8(e) shows that
the prevailing law of secondary boycotts was to serve as a guide in the
application of that provision. Section 8(e) agreements were referred to
in the legislative debates as a form of secondary boycott," a contract to
13
enter into a secondary boycott,' 2 and a loophole in section 8(b) (4) .
Thus, section 8(e) was designed to prevent a union and employer from
voluntarily agreeing to do what section 8(b) (4) prohibits a union from
forcing the employer to do. There are two ways in which activity such as
that agreed to in the present case might be argued to violate section
8(b) (4). First, the refusals might be argued to turn the picketing, otherwise primary, into secondary activity. Second, the secondary union might
be said to violate the section if it, rather than the picketing union, induced
the refusals. These arguments will be considered in order.
The Supreme Court and several courts of appeals have held that
primary picketing at the place of business of the employer is not made
secondary by refusals of neutral employees to cross the picket lines, even
if the picketing union intended to influence the neutrals not to cross.' 4

0

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to
engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment
to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services where
an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring . . . any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in
the products of any other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease
doing business with any other person ....
Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947) (amended by 73
Stat. 542 (1959), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963)).
1093 CONG. Rzc. 4323 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft), in 2 LMRA HIsTORY
1106.
11105 CoNG. Rxc. 15539 (1959) (remarks of Representative Thompson), in 2

LMRDA HISTORY 1575.
'2105 CONG. RFc. app. A8359 (1959)
water), in 2 LMRDA HISTORY 1829.

(extension of remarks of Senator Gold-

13 H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959), in 1 LMRDA HISTORY

778-79.
'4 Local 761, UEW v. NLRB (General Electric), 366 U.S. 667 (1961) ; NLRB
v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951); Seafarers Union v. NLRB
(Salt Dome), 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Teamsters Union (Milwaukee Plywood), 126 N.L.R.B. 650, enforced, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960).
The narrow holding of NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., supra, was that
there was no secondary activity involved because there was no encouragement to "concerted" activity; however, the decision does contain language indicating that the result
would be the same without resort to the "concerted" requirement. Id. at 672-73. Therefore, although § 8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat.
542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (i) (Supp. IV, 1963), removed the "concerted"
requirement, so that Rice Milling's precedent value might be questioned, it is often
cited for the proposition set forth in the text. E.g., Local 761, UEW v. NLRB
(General Electric), supra at 674. The legislative history of the § 8(b) (4) (B) proviso,
added by 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (Supp. IV, 1963), declaring
that nothing in (B) would make unlawful where not otherwise unlawful any primary
strike or picketing, indicates that Congress in legislatively overruling the Rice Milling
"concerted" requirement did not intend to alter the result of the decision. 105 CONG.
REc. 16589 (1959) (remarks of Representative Thompson), in 2 LMRDA HISTORY
1707; see Local 761, UEW v. NLRB (General Electric), supra at 681; Lesnick, .rupra
note 5, at 1396.
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In its decision the Board was almost exclusively concerned with legislative

history. 15 It did not mention these decisions. However, in its brief before
the court, the Board limited their application to situations in which there
is a strike. 6 Moreover, the Board's reliance on the section 8(b) (4)
proviso, with its two requirements, suggests that the Board would not
consider the cases relevant to minority union activity. The Board argued
that these cases dealt with the extent to which the union's conduct in a
primary strike retained its primary status, despite adverse impact upon
neutral employers. In reversing the Board, the court of appeals declined
to limit the effect of the cases to situations involving strikes approved or
ratified by a majority union.
Failure to satisfy the two requirements of the section 8(b) (4) proviso
should not make the agreement incompatible with section 8(e) unless
picketing not satisfying these requirements would violate the secondary
boycott provisions of section 8(b) (4). There is no authority indicating
that picketing is made secondary if unaccompanied by a strike. In fact
17
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., in which the Supreme Court
8
It
held picketing primary, does not appear to have involved a strike.'

I5 Whereas the legislative history, see notes 11-13 supra, uniformly indicates that
the purpose of § 8(e) was only to preclude secondary activity, the history, such as
that relied on by the Board, discussing application of the primary-secondary distinction
to factual situations involving nonproviso picketing, is contradictory. The Board
relied on 105 CONG. REc. 14343 (1959) (remarks of Representative Cramer), in 2
LMRDA HISTORY 1619-20. The Board's result is also supported by the remarks of
Representative Thompson. 105 CONG. REC. 15222 (1959), in 2 LMRDA HISTORY 1708.
On the other hand, there is substantial history supporting the court's result.
H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 78 (1959), in 1 LMRDA HISTORY 779,
836; 105 CONG. REc. 14988 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), in 2 LMRDA
(remarks of Senator Kennedy), in
HISTORY 1325; 105 CONG. REc. 17719-20 (1959)
2 LMRDA HISTORY 1389; 105 CONG. R!c. app. A8372 (1959) (extension of remarks
of Senator Douglas), in 2 LMRDA HISTORY 1834.
Some legislative history even indicates that § 8(e) would make illegal collectivebargaining agreements sanctioning refusals to cross any picket line. 105 CONG. REc.
13872-73 (1959) (remarks of Senator Morse), in 2 LMRDA HISTORY 1315-16; 105
CONG. REc. 15847 (1959) (remarks of Representative O'Hara), in 2 LMRDA HISTORY
1689. The trial examiner took this position in his opinion. The House bill as reported by committee contained a specific disclaimer clause providing that the refusal
to cross a picket line would be neither illegal nor grounds for discharge. This clause
was deleted from the final bill.
The following statement by Mr. justice Frankfurter concerning the Taft-Hartley
Act is relevant here also: "[T]he . . . Act was, to a marked degree, the result of
conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on
the role of organized labor .

.

.

."

Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB,

357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958) (dictum).
16 Brief for Respondent, p. 22 n.16.
'7341 U.S. 665 (1951).
18 The agents of a union involved in an organizational campaign conducted the
picketing. The fact that the employees did not participate indicates that they were
not on strike. In addition Markwell v. Local 978, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 227
F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Mo. 1964), and Lumber & Sawmill Workers (Santa Ana
Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 937 (1949), involved picketing in a recognition dispute
without a strike, and the Board and court held that the refusals to cross the picket
lines did not make the activity secondary. In Piezonki v. NLRB, 219 F.2d 879 (4th
Cir. 1955); Plumbers & Pipe Fitters Union (Central Plumbing & Heating Corp.),
145 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (Dec. 2, 1963); and Monterey County Bldg. Trades Council
(Vito J.La Torre), 142 N.L.R.B. 139 (1963), although the court found secondary
boycott violations, the fact that the picketing was not accompanied by a strike was
not mentioned.
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is also unlikely that picketing by a minority union for organizational or
recognitional purposes is secondary. 19 Moreover, neither any court nor the
Board has held that, because a minority union was involved, picketing
otherwise primary was made secondary by the refusal of neutral employees
to cross.20

Although the court did rely on the primary dispute cases, 21 it did not
define the relationship between them and the collective-bargaining agreement in question; nor has this court or any other court articulated
Analysis of this area must be founded
the policy underlying them.2°
boycott23 and "hot cargo" A
the
secondary
that
recognition
upon the
provisions were designed to limit the amount of economic pressure a union
could exert against a neutral employer in a dispute which did not concern
the neutral employer or his relationship with his employees.5 However,
these provisions were not designed to isolate the neutral employer from all
adverse effects arising from labor disputes of other employers.2 6 In a
dispute between a union and the primary employer, the neutral employer
will be adversely affected if a work stoppage occurs at the primary place
of business, since the business relationship between the primary and neutral
employers will be disrupted. Since the secondary boycott and the "hot
cargo" provisions were not intended to limit primary activity,2 7 if the
effect of the activity on the neutral is no greater than the effect which would
occur as a result of a successful primary strike, the activity in question
19 In NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters Union (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S. 274 (1960),
it was held that this activity was not a violation of § 8(b) (1), added by 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (1958) (coercion of employees in the exercise of
their § 7 rights). The Court declared that, "Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the Board to regulate peaceful 'recognitional' picketing only when it is employed
to accomplish objectives specified in § 8(b) (4) . . . ." 362 U.S. at 290. Thus it
seems that minority recognitional picketing is not a per se violation of § 8(b) (4).
However, the provisions of § 8(b) (7), 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7)
(Supp. IV, 1963), relating to organizational and recognitional picketing must be
adhered to.
20 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951); Markwell v.
Local 978, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 227 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. Mo. 1964); and Lumber
& Sawmill Workers (Santa Ana Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 937 (1949), involved
picketing in organizational or recognitional disputes. It is not clear whether the unions
involved in these disputes represented majorities or minorities. The absence of any
finding on this issue in cases where the courts did not find any secondary activity
indicates that the majority or minority status of the union is irrelevant
21Local 761, UEW v. NLRB (General Electric), 366 U.S. 667 (1961); NLRB
v. International Rice Milling Co., supra note 20; Seafarers Union v. NLRB (Salt
Dome), 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Teamsters Union (Milwaukee Plywood),
126 N.L.R.B. 650, enforced, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960).
22The Supreme Court's decision in United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Carrier
Corp.), 376 U.S. 492 (1964), the latest case in the area, is no exception.
23 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4), as amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. IV, 1963).
24 National Labor Relations Act § 8(e), added by 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1963).
25 See Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727, 728 (1951).
26 id.at 732.
27 See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
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should be legal s Thus, when neutral employees involved in the everyday
operations of the primary employer refuse to cross picket lines at the
primary employer's place of business, such refusals should not make the
picketing secondary.2 0 The Board's distinction between strike and nostrike situations is erroneous, because refusals of neutral employees to cross
picket lines at another place of business have the same effect on the neutral
employer whether or not a strike occurs. The Board's requirement that
the activity be approved by a majority union is also inconsistent with this
analysis, since the majority or minority status of the picketing union is
irrelevant to the effect on the neutral employer of the refusals of his employees to cross the picket lines.
Furthermore, Congress has enacted in section 8(b) (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act3o a comprehensive regulatory scheme covering recognitional or organizational picketing, including that by a minority union.
Except for the provisions of that section, as the Supreme Court declared
in NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters Union (Curtis Bros.), "it seems clear,
and we hold, that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act authorized the Board
to regulate peaceful 'recognitional' picketing only when it is employed to
accomplish objectives specified in § 8(b) (4) . . . ." "I Thus, the Board
should not try to limit minority recognitional picketing by finding agreements sanctioning the refusals to cross such picket lines a violation of
section 8(e).
It might be argued that the neutral union would violate section
8(b) (4) if it, rather than the primary union, induced the refusals. According to this argument the refusals would be secondary because not an
incidental effect of the primary picketing. However, there is no judicial
support for the argument3 2 Moreover, it is immaterial from the standpoint
28 Cf. Seafarers Union v. NLRB (Salt Dome), 265 F2d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir.
1959) ; Lesnick, supra note 5, at 1413.
This analysis shows the inadequacy of a literal approach. Thus, although it
could be argued that the picketing violated the clear language of § 8(b) (4), or that the
agreement sanctioning the refusals to cross the picket lines violated the clear language
of § 8(e), if the effect on the neutral was no greater than the effect that would occur
during a primary dispute, there would not be any violation of the provisions. The
rejection of the literal approach is well supported. E.g., Local 761, UEW v. NLRB
(General Electric), 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961) ; Lesnick, supra note 5, at 1394.
29 This analysis does not extend to a situation involving picketing by a primary
union at a neutral's place of business even though the effect on the neutral may be
the same as if the primary employer had been shut down by a strike. Such picketing
is clearly secondary.
(Supp. IV, 1963).
SO Added by 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7)
31 NLRB v. Local 639, Teamsters Union (Curtis Bros.), 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960).
32 In Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1960), the primary
union had a dispute with a parent corporation. The primary union established picket
lines at a subsidiary's place of business, and the neutral union of the subsidiary induced
its members not to cross the picket lines. The Board held the neutral's inducements
were not secondary because there was identity of employers and therefore no neutral
employer who could be affected by any secondary activity. This is the only secondary
boycott case involving inducements by neutral unions.
It has been held more times than not that the refusal to cross picket lines at
another place of business is protected activity. The Board has uniformly held that
this activity is protected. L. G. Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963); Redwing
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of effect on the neutral employer whether the inducement not to cross is
made by the neutral union or the picketing union, because in either case the
effect is the same as that which would result from a strike which dosed
down the primary employer.

TAXATION-EXPENSES OF COLLECTING INCOmE FROM CORPORATE
LiQUIDATIoN HELD DEDUCTIBI. UNDER SECTIoN 212 EvEN THoUGH
IwooaF RoGmzED AS CAPrAL GAmN

Corporation A was dissolved and its assets, consisting of cash and a
contract claim of unascertainable market value against corporation R,1
were distributed to its shareholders. The former shareholders of A
engaged legal counsel to recover the sums allegedly due under the contract,
and negotiations led to a settlement. Each former shareholder received
his pro rata share of the settlement, minus the legal and banking fees
incurred in pressing the claim.2 Taxpayer, a former shareholder of A,
returned the excess of his gross receipts from the liquidation over the basis
of his stock as long-term capital gain.s He deducted his share of the
banking and legal fees as "ordinary and necessary expenses" incurred in the
collection of income. 4 The Commissioner disallowed the deduction, claiming that the expenses were capital in nature and should be deducted from
Carrier, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962). Although Redwing was enforced, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court of appeals did not
pass on the protected activity question. The court reversed the Board in Everist
without deciding the protected activity issue in a situation where the inducements
not to cross clearly were made by the neutral union. 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
However, the court allowed the employer to discharge the employees permanently.
It would seem that, even if the court agreed that the activity was protected, the
practical effect of allowing the employer to discharge the employees would make
meaningless the characterization of the activity as protected. The court in NLRB v.
Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), held that, although refusals
made by the employee in his free time would be protected activity, they were not
protected while the employee was working. The Supreme Court avoided this issue
by declaring that the employee breached a no-strike provision of the collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 113-14
(1953).
1-A produced three motion pictures which were distributed and exhibited by R.
A was to receive a specified portion of the profits from the distribution and exhibition,
but a dispute arose over whether R was entitled to charge certain expenses against
the receipts and whether A was entitled to share in certain foreign profits. Since
A claimed it was entitled to more income and R claimed it had paid in full, the
Commissioner stipulated that the claim had no ascertainable market value.
2 The former shareholders engaged a bank to receive and disburse any settlement
proceeds and deposited the cash from the liquidation to pay for anticipated legal
expenses.
3
The assets received from the liquidation were treated as being received in
exchange for the stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 331 (a) (1) [hereinafter all sections
cited refer to INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954]. Gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset is taxed as capital gain. INT. Rr v. CODE OF 1954, § 1222(3).
4 "In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(1) for
the production or collection of income . . . ." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212.
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the amount received for the stock,5 but the Tax Court, four judges dissenting, sustained the taxpayer.6 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, with one dissent, affirmed, holding that the expenses were incurred
in the "collection of income" and were deductible under section 212 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 7 Commissioner v. Doering, 335 F.2d
738 (2d Cir. 1964).
The Commissioner's contention was that since the liquidation transaction remained open until the taxpayer received the income from the
claim, the expenses were incurred as part of the liquidation exchange,
were similar to selling expenses, and were capital in nature. The court
found that the facts presented two separate transactions-the exchange of
the stock for the claim and the collection of the claimY The court indicated
that the Commissioner's position would cause an unjustifiable difference
in result between a case like the present and one where the corporation had
paid for legal services before liquidation, since the expenses would then
have been "ordinary and necessary." 9 It was further noted by the court
that section 212 applies to expenses incurred in the collection of income,
and that "income" is not "confined to recurring income but applies as well
to gains from the disposition of property." 10 The court found that no
different result was warranted because the transaction was held "open"
for tax purposes.
Upon the liquidation of a corporation, a shareholder ordinarily receives cash or other assets in return for his stock. The gain or loss on
the transaction is measured by the difference between the fair market
value of the assets received and the adjusted basis of the stock."1 The
liquidation transaction is then considered closed and any future income
from the assets received is taxed as ordinary income.' 2
5 Although § 212 would seem to apply to all expenses, the courts have held that
those business expenses which were capital in nature under § 162 are not deductible
under § 212. Since expenses which were essential to the sale or exchange were not
deductible under § 162, they are not deductible under § 212. See, e.g., Iowa So. Util.
Co. v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Munson v. McGinnes, 283
F.2d 333, 336 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 880 (1960).
The regulations provide that expenses which are capital in nature are not deductible under § 212. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(n) (1957).
o Otto C. Doering, Jr., 39 T.C. 647 (1963). For a criticism of this decision see
Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913, 919-20 n.15 (9th Cir. 1963).
7 The dissent thought that the expenses should be capitalized as part of the
liquidation exchange. It pointed out that under the court's theory a transaction which
actually produced a net profit could be returned as a net loss. Instant case at 743.
The majority noted this possibility but cited Hanover Bank v. Commissioner, 369
U.S. 672, 687 (1962), which stated that courts must give taxpayers benefits to which
they are entitled by the wording of the statute. The court noted that the deduction
was permitted in Hanover Bank even though the taxpayer there initiated a capital
transaction for the deliberate purpose of registering an ordinary loss. In the instant
case taxpayer did not have such a purpose.
8
Instant case at 742 n.1.
9
INT. RFv. CoDF OF 1954, § 162(a).
' The court derived this notion from the legislative history of § 212. See H.R.
RE. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 87 (1942). The regulations also adhere to this principle. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1212-1 (b) (1957).
1 Camnpagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1961).
12Id. at 683-84.
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However, when it is impossible to ascertain the fair market value of
an asset received in liquidation, the taxpayer's gain or loss on the transaction cannot be immediately measured. In such a situation the courts
have held that the liquidation remains an "open transaction" 13 as long as
the taxpayer receives income from the assets; the subsequent payments are
treated as received in exchange for the stock and are taxed as capital gain.' 4
The concept of the open transaction stems from the holding of the
Supreme Court in Burnet v. Logan,15 where the taxpayer sold stock for
cash and rights to receive future income. The right to future income had
no ascertainable market value and the cash received did not equal the basis
of the taxpayer's stock. When taxpayer received payments in future years,
she treated them as a return of capital. The Commissioner attempted to
allocate the payments between a return of capital and income, but the
Court upheld the taxpayer's treatment of all the payments as a return,
of capital. The Court said that the transaction remained open until thet
taxpayer recovered her basis, and that any payments received before that
time were a return of capital.' 6
This concept was extended to the area of corporate liquidations in
Commissioner v. Carter,17 in which the taxpayer received oil brokerage
contracts of unascertainable market value from a corporate liquidation.
As she received income from the contracts in later years, she treated the
excess over her basis as capital gains. The court of appeals upheld the
taxpayer's contention that the transaction remained open and extended the
Burnet theory so that all income, even after the basis was recovered, would
be accorded capital gains treatment.' s
Since Carter, the open transaction concept has been accepted by the
Commissioner.' 9 The concept is advantageous to the taxpayer in that he is
taxed at capital gains rates on whatever he actually receives from the
liquidation. 0 It has been criticized on the grounds that ordinary income
'3 See Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Commissioner v. Carter,
170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).

Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. Buu.. 15.
'5283 U.S. 404 (1931).
'6 The Court based its decision in part on the treatment of annuities at that time.
Citing Burnet v. Whiteside, 283 U.S. 148 (1931), the Court said that income from
annuities was not taxed until the invested sum was recovered. The present Code
permits the Commissioner to allocate payments received under an annuity between
a return of investment and income, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 72, which may imply
14

that the Court, if presented with the Burnet facts as an original proposition, might
reach a different result
17170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
Is See also Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949).
19 Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 15. Mertens believes that the concept
has not been more strenuously combatted by the Commissioner because it is a rule
with the administrative advantage of eliminating the often difficult problem of estimating a fair market value of assets almost impossible to evaluate. 2 MERTErs,
FEDEAr. IxcomE TAXATi N § 11.06, at 20 n.15 (Zimet rev. 1961).
20 If the open transaction concept were not available, the taxpayer who receives
an asset of unascertainable market value from a corporate liquidation would be in
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can be thereby converted into capital gains.21 Because of this possibility,
the Commissioner has limited the use of the concept to those "rare and
extraordinary circumstances" where the asset received from a liquidation
has no ascertainable market value.22
The present case is the first instance of a court's having to decide
the status of expenses incurred in connection with an open transaction.
Prior cases dealing with the concept were concerned only with classifying
the income as ordinary income or capital gains, and at no time were those
courts faced with the problem of classifying any expenses involved in the
transaction.23 The classification of the expenses is of considerable importance to the taxpayer. Capital gains are taxed at a maximum rate of
twenty-five percent 2 while the present maximum rate on ordinary income
is seventy-seven percent. 3 Because of the higher rates, it is usually more
advantageous for a taxpayer to have expenses reduce his ordinary income.
The distinction usually made between the two classes of deductions is
between those expenses considered an essential incident to the transaction
and those expenses incurred to enforce the terms of the sale or exchange.
The former are held capital in nature,2 the latter deductible as ordinary
27
and necessary expenses.
Insofar as the court found that the open transaction had no effect on
the expenditures and that there were two separate transactions, the decision is consistent with those cases holding that expenses incurred in collecting income from a sale or exchange are deductible.2 8 However, the
court, in attempting to treat the expenditures in the same manner as if A
had remained in business or had paid the expenses, overlooks the fact
that the liquidation did change the nature of the income derived from the
contract between A and R to capital gains. If A had incurred the expenditures, it is true that the expenses would have been deductible under section
162, but it is also true that the income would have been taxed at ordinary
a strategic dilemma. The taxpayer would be forced to estimate a value, and if he
overestimates, he may be forced to pay taxes on capital gain which he never realizes.
If he underestimates, he may be forced to pay taxes at ordinary rates on all income
received over the estimated value of the asset. See Gersten v. Commissioner, 267
F.2d 195, 199 (9th Cir. 1959).
21 See generally Farer, Corporate Liquidations: Transmuting Ordinary Income
Into Capital Gains, 75 HARv. L. REv. 527 (1962).
22 Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 Cum. Bum. 15, 16; see Treas. Reg. §1.1001-1(a)

(1957).
23

See, e.g., Westover v. Smith, 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v.

Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1201 (b).
25 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1 (b).
26 See, e.g., Spreckels v. Commissioner,
2

315 U.S. 626 (1942) (commissions on
sale of stock) ; Munson v. McGinnes, 283 F2d 333 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S.

880 (1960) (legal fees on sale of stock) ; Davis v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 441 (8th
Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 783 (1946) (broker's fees) ; Isaac G. Johnson &
Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1945) (legal fees for condemnation proceedings).
27 Naylor v. Commissioner, 203 F2d 346 (5th Cir. 1953); see Munson v.

McGinnes, supra note 26, at 335 (dictum).
28 Ibid.
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rates, not as capital gains as in the present case. If the court had not disregarded the fact that a liquidation did take place which had an effect on the
income, it would have squarely confronted the basic issue in the case-how
to characterize an expenditure which was an essential incident to an "open
transaction."
The court stated: "To be sure, the Commissioner is right that the
word 'income' in § 212(1) is not to be given a wholly literal reading. If
a taxpayer sells securities or other capital assets, § 212(1) does not permit
him to deduct expenses of sale even though the sale produces a gain which
constitutes 'gross income' .

.

.

."

2

The taxpayer in the present case

received a disputed legal claim from the liquidation, which by its nature
is of value because of its potential collectibility. When the legal claim was
distributed as an asset in exchange for the stock, it was contemplated that
the conversion of the intangible asset into cash would necessitate expenditures for legal fees. This, in effect, reduced the fair market value of the
asset received in liquidation, even though the determination of that value
awaited the actual collection of the claim. The legal expenses were thereby
as much an essential incident to the capital transaction as are broker's
commissions on the sale of stock-which are recognized as being capital
in nature because contemplated as being necessary to the consummation of
the sale or exchange5 0 The exchange in the present case continued until
the income was received under the open transaction concept, and the expenses were incurred to close the transaction. It is thus more logical to
deduct these expenses from the taxpayer's capital gain rather than from
ordinary income. 5 '
The net effect of the court's failure to treat the expenditures as part
of the exchange is to make a concept which was very favorable to the taxpayer even more attractive. The holding, if followed by other courts,
should lead to attempts by the Commissioner to limit the use of the open
transaction to even more "rare and extraordinary circumstances" 32 than
in the past.
29

Instant case at 741.
30 See, e.g., Davis v. Commissioner, 151 F2d 441 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 783 (1946).
31 The taxpayer relied largely on Naylor v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 346 (5th
Cir. 1953), in which the petitioner had given to another an option to purchase stock
at "book value." The buyer exercised his option to purchase, but a dispute arose
over book value. The taxpayer then incurred legal expenses in collecting the sale
price. The taxpayer returned his gain as capital income and deducted the legal
expenses from his ordinary income. The court held that the sale was "consummated!
when the option was exercised, and that the expenses were incurred in the collection
of income, a separate transaction, and were therefore "ordinary and necessary."
Naylor could have been considered an open transaction since the "book value"
of the stock was unascertainable; but the court held the transaction closed, thus
avoiding the issue presented in the instant case-the characterization of expenses incident to an open transaction. The court in the present case expressly left open the
question of whether it would follow the Naylor decision if presented with the same
facts. Naylor has been criticized in Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913, 919-20
n.15 (9th Cir. 1963), and has been called "questionable" by Mertens, 4 MEauziNs,
FEDERAI. Ilqcomm TAXATIoN § 25A.12 n.40 (Zimet rev. 1960).
32 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.

